Employment Discrimination in the Firm: Does the Legal System Provide Remedies for Women and Minority Members of the Bar? by Smith, Eyana J.
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN THE FIRM:
DOES THE LEGAL SYSTEM PROVIDE REMEDIES
FOR WOMEN AND MINORITY MEMBERS OF THE
BAR?
Eyana J. Smith"
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been fifty years since the ratification of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and still a question remains as to whether legal
professionals, primarily attorneys, have a rightful claim under Title VII
against their employers for acts of employment discrimination. The case
law in this area is sparse; this is partly because of the reluctance of
attorneys to speak out against discriminating employers (in avoidance of
professional ridicule and blackballing) and partly because of the
tremendous failure rates of these kinds of cases in court. Rarely do they
survive a motion for summary judgment, and those cases not dismissed as
frivolous are often settled.
I argue that there are two major reasons why the law does not appear
to provide much tolerance for employment discrimination or harassment
suits by attorneys. First, discrimination and harassment are both hard to
prove, especially in law firms where the risk of losing one's job constantly
looms over the heads of the associates. Discriminatory patterns, often
tracked through hiring and firing, are almost impossible to find in law firms
because of the extremely high turnover rates. This, in turn, makes it almost
impossible to differentiate between those being pushed out of a job
discriminatorily, and those being pushed out for permissible reasons-for
example because they are unproductive.
Second, attorneys are likely to suffer a large amount of backlash for
reporting discrimination claims. Often an attorney who files a charge is
considered a complainer, and since many legal communities are small, the
reputation of a trouble-making attorney will travel fast. This may result in
an attorney being blackballed from the legal community (particularly law
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firms), even if the discriminatory allegations are found to be true.
In spite of the bad tracl record with employment discrimination cases,
a few high profile cases brought by attorneys against their legal employers
have forced these employers to take certain measures to prevent and handle
problems incident to increasing diversity within the workplace. Corporate
clients, which are more often hit with these kinds of cases, have also begun
to pressure corporate law firms to increase diversity. Undoubtedly, this
newly sparked enthusiasm in legal environment diversity is long overdue.
The questions still remain as to whether the court system is sympathetic
enough to attorney diversity issues, and whether a change in the application
of Title VII to these issues is in sight. Furthermore, where the court system
fails in these areas, are legal employers doing enough to prevent
discrimination and harassment in the workplace?
This article will confront these questions by providing an analysis of
employment discrimination and harassment in legal workplaces, focusing
on law firms. Part II provides an overview of employment discrimination
law particularly in the context of legal employers. Part III summarizes
employment discrimination cases brought against legal employers. The
primary discussion will focus on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
although state employment discrimination laws will be mentioned. Parts
IV and V theorize why Title VII claims are generally unsuccessful against
legal employers. Part VI suggests ways that legal employers can prevent
employment discrimination or harassment claims, and explores the ways in
which law firms have incorporated these suggestions into their
infrastructures. Part VII concludes the article.
II. A SYNOPSIS OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
As the grandfather of federal employment discrimination law, Title
VII was created to prohibit all employers covered under the Act from
discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.'
This includes discrimination done in the form of hiring, firing, application
collection, or compensation practices or any other areas related to the terms
and conditions of employment.' Title VII's main purpose is to prevent
employers from classifying employees in such a way that would deprive
them of employment opportunities. Title VII was created by Congress "to
1. 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2 (2002). This comment will not discuss age discrimination or
disability discrimination, which are covered separately under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 621 (2002), and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. § 12101 (2003).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
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remov[e] ... artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment
when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial
or other impermissible classification. 3 To that end, it limits employees'
use of the statute so that they cannot bring race or gender claims simply to
thwart all employer decision-making. Title VII not only applies to
disparate treatment of employees based on a protected classification, but to
disparate impact cases as well.4
Additionally, before filing a Title VII case, the plaintiff must file a
charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).5
This administrative agency often will decide whether or not a complaint is
6legitimate. The EEOC enforces Title VII and has the authority to
investigate employment discrimination and sexual harassment complaints,7
and subject them to adjudication if indeed a valid complaint is found. The
EEOC only has jurisdiction over complaints made against employers of
more than fifteen persons, since it must adhere to Title VII's definition of
an employer.8
To qualify as an employer under Title VII, one must be a "person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more
employees.., but ... does not include (1) the United States, a corporation
wholly owned by the [g]overnment... or (2) a bona fide private
membership club (other than a labor organization) which is exempt from
taxation.. . ,9 Under the Act, a "person" for the purposes of the statute
can include "individuals ... labor unions, partnerships, associations,
corporations, legal representatives.., trusts, [and] unincorporated
organizations .... ",,10 With respect to legal employers, Title VII applies
unless the attorney is a government lawyer or works for a tax-exempt
private membership organization."
3. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-01 (1973) (quoting Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971)).
4. See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432-33 (1971) (holding that
Title VII requires the elimination of employment practices that operated to exclude African
Americans and were not directly related to job performance, notwithstanding the employer's
lack of discriminatory intent). Disparate impact cases cover those situations where an
employer's facially neutral employment policy has a discriminatory impact on a protected
class. This article will only discuss employment discrimination by legal employers in the
context of individual disparate treatment of attorneys, and not disparate impact.
5. See generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (granting enforcement authority of Title VII to
the EEOC).
6. See id. at § 2000e-5(6) (providing EEOC with power to determine if a complaint
provides reasonable cause to file suit).
7. Patricia S. Eyres, Harassment Measures, L.A. LAW., July/Aug. 2002, at 39, 40.
8. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b) (2002).
9. Id.
10. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(a).
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (applying the definition of employer under Title VII to all
organizations except the government or tax-exempt organizations).
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1.Common Law Treatment of Discrimination Cases Against Legal
Employers Under Title VII
To win a Title VII claim, the plaintiff first must establish a prima facie
case that: 1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected class; 2) the
discrimination occurred during some sort of protected activity (i.e., terms
or conditions of employment); 3) the employer took an adverse action
against the plaintiff. 2 Only after the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case
does the burden of production shift to the employer to prove there was a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the action. 3 Once the defendant
has offered a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, the presumption of
discrimination that is created after the plaintiff proves the prima facie case
is lifted.14  To win the case, the plaintiff then must prove that the
employer's reason is pretextual. 5 Texas Department of Community Affairs
v. Burdine16 expanded the McDonnell-Douglas rule in holding that the
three prong rule only shifts the burden of production of proof to the
17defendant, not the burden of persuasion. The pretext prong is used by the
plaintiff to meet his or her burden of persuasion so that the ultimate proof
of unlawful discrimination lies with the plaintiff.'8
While these three prongs (prima facie case, nondiscriminatory reason,
and pretext) suffice for cases where the only evidence is circumstantial, the
Supreme Court expanded the McDonnell-Douglas/Burdine Rule for mixed-
motive cases that do involve direct evidence in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins. 9 In a mixed-motive case, the defendant-employer admits that
race or sex played a factor in the decision-making process, but can assert an
affirmative defense to discrimination by showing that there was a
nondiscriminatory basis for the action as well.20 The affirmative defense is
only established, however, if the employer can prove that it would have
12. See Wright v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 2936 at *2 (4th Cir.
2000) (per curiam) (granting summary judgment to the employer because of the plaintiff's
failure to prove the third prong of the Title VII prima facie case).
13. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802 (holding that when a prima facie case
for discrimination is found and a non-discriminatory reason is given, the plaintiff shall have
a fair opportunity to prove this reason is pretextual).
14. Id. at 802-03 (concluding that the defendant's assertion of a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason suffices to discharge the plaintiffs proof of discrimination).
15. Id.
16. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
17. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993).
18. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
19. 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989) (creating an affirmative defense to discrimination if
nondiscriminatory factors were considered along with gender).
20. Id. at 246.
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made the same decision even if sex or race was not a factor.2' Courts have
differed as to when to apply McDonnell-Douglas/Burdine and when to
apply Price Waterhouse. While the plaintiff is generally allowed to
choose, many plaintiffs argue both theories in their cases. After viewing
the evidence when a motion for summary judgment or a motion to set aside
the verdict has been filed, the court then decides which theory has merit.
22
The Supreme Court drew the line as to which standard (Price Waterhouse
or McDonnell-Douglas) to use by distinguishing between direct and
circumstantial evidence.2 3 Although this was the distinguishing factor for
the plurality in Price Waterhouse, Justice O'Connor in her concurring
opinion apparently disagreed and believed that all Title VII cases required a
24showing of direct evidence.
The Price Waterhouse and McDonnell-Douglas/Burdine tests both
have been used in the individual disparate treatment context. Title VII also
covers discrimination through disparate impact and systemic disparate
treatment, neither of which are the focus of this article.
2. Sexual Harassment Treatment Under Title VII
While discrimination has always been somewhat of a concern under
Title VII, a growing problem in the legal community is sexual harassment.
The EEOC defines it as unwelcome sexual advances or conduct when: 1)
submission to such conduct is explicitly or implicitly made a term or
condition of employment; or 2) submission to or rejection of such conduct
is used as the basis for employment decisions; or 3) such conduct has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the employee's work
performance or it creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment.25  Sexual harassment cases, although they can be brought
under Title VII, are not explicitly named in Title VII. 26  However, the
Supreme Court made it very clear in 1998 through its treatment of the issue
21. Id. at 242.
22. See Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1142 n.2 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that a judge
after evaluating the evidence can determine whether the case is a pretext or a mixed motive
case when a plaintiff has not classified the case at the outset).
23. The distinction mainly comes from combining the plurality's opinion and Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). The
plurality inferred that Congress intended Title VII to allow circumstantial evidence to prove
unlawful discrimination. Id. at 241. Justice O'Connor disagreed, concluding that Title VII
only allowed for direct evidence of discrimination to prove the plaintiff's case. Id. at 270
(O'Connor, J., concurring). The O'Connor opinion has generally been regarded as the
holding of this case. See Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d at 1142-43 (citing O'Connor's plurality
opinion as precedent).
24. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 270.
25. Eyres, supra note 7, at 40.
26. Id. at 39.
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27in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
282
Services, Inc., 2 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,29 that sexual
harassment is a problem that will be eradicated under federal civil rights
laws. The purpose of these laws is to deter employee harassment by
making employers vicariously liable for their employees' acts. By doing
so, the laws encourage employers to take responsibility for their
employees' actions by developing programs that will allow for harassment-
free work environments. Unlike discrimination suits in which the
discriminating act itself is the focus of the law suit, harassment suits focus
instead on the employer's response to the harassment, and not the
harassment itself. Yet because both ultimately deal with some sort of
classification, both can be brought under federal and state civil rights laws.
B. Section 1981
Section 1981 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code is a discrimination statute
created to prevent unlawful discrimination in distributing contracts. The
statute provides that "[a]ll persons... shall have the same right ... to make
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens... ,,30 The terms "make and
enforce contracts" include "the making, performance, modification, and
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges,
terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship. 31 Section 1981 gives
groups protected under Title VII the ability to engage in contracts, an area
that has historically discouraged minorities and women from embarking
12upon several employment opportunities. By allowing all individuals the
opportunity to engage in contracts, this statute functions to prevent
employers from using contract law as a pretext for unlawful discrimination.
Although section 1981 can be used to prevent discrimination in all
areas where contracting is done (for example, in housing discrimination or
in contractor bids), the application of the rule to employment contracts is
27. 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (holding that employers are held vicariously liable for
failing to prevent sex harassment by their employees).
28. 523 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1998) (concluding that same-sex harassment is a violation
under Title VII).
29. 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (holding that an employer is vicariously liable for a
harassing environment but if no tangible action of employment is affected by the harassment
then the employer can use this as an affirmative defense to mitigate liability).
30. 42 U.S.C.A. § 198 1(a) (2002).
31. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981(b).
32. See generally Bradwell v. Ill., 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J.,
concurring) (commenting that one reason why women cannot practice law is because of the
inability for married women to make contracts without their husband's consent).
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obvious. For instance, if a Hispanic employee is fired and believes that the
motive was discrimination, he or she could simultaneously bring a Title VII
claim and hence go through the McDonnell-Douglas/Burdine burdens of
proof, and bring a section 1981 claim by first proving that the employment
was contracted (not at-will), and then proving unlawful discrimination.
C. State Employment Laws and Administrative Agencies
Almost every state in the country has adopted its own laws to deal
with employment discrimination and harassment.33 To enforce these laws,
the states have created administrative agencies to deal swiftly with
employment complaints. 34 Many of the state discrimination laws closely
mirror Title VII and ADEA. As with Title VII, the implications of sexual
harassment laws in these statutes are implicit and enforced through the
common law.35 Some states, however, have included in these laws explicit
language deterring sexual harassment.36 Still other states enforce sexual
harassment policies purely through state common law and state human
rights organizations, like the Pennsylvania Human Rights Commission or
the Alaska State Commission for Human Rights.37
33. See infra notes 33 and 34.
34. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-100 (2003) (authorizing the Connecticut
Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities to deal with discrimination); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 760.04-07 (West 2003) (authorizing and empowering the Florida Commission on
Human Relations).
35. The following state statutes prohibit sexual harassment implicitly: ALASKA STAT. §
18.80.220 (Michie 2002); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940 (West 2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
760.01 (West 2003); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2 (2003); IDAHO CODE § 67-5901 (Michie
2003); IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.6 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1001 (2002); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.040 (Banks-Baldwin); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B § 4 (2003); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 16 (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4572 (West 2003); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 37.220.2 (2003); MINN. STAT. § 363A.08 (2003); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 213.055
(West 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-01 (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West
2003); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (West
2003); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 951 (2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-101(a)(3) (2003); TEX.
LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.051 (Vernon 2003); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.180 (2004).
36. The following statutes explicitly prohibit sexual harassment: ALASKA STAT. §
23,10.440 (Michie 2002); CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.4 (2003); ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/2-102(D)
(West 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 807 (West 2002); WIS. STAT. § 11 1.36(1)(b)
(2003).
37. See, e.g., 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 959 (2003) (outlining the procedures for filing a
complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Rights Commission (PHRC)); ALASKA STAT. §
18.80.100 (Michie 2002) (describing the procedure for filing a complaint with the Alaska
State Commission for Human Rights (ASCHR)).
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III. CASES AGAINST LEGAL EMPLOYERS UNDER TITLE VII
A. Racial Discrimination Suits
It is necessary first to evaluate the law suits that have made the legal
profession turn more of an ear towards discrimination and harassment
within the legal work environment. One of the least progressive types of
suits have been those involving racial discrimination. As with most Title
VII suits, racial discrimination suits particularly against legal employers,
are vulnerable to failure at summary judgment. But there are a few suits
that have gone to both the trial level and to the appellate level.
One of the most progressive suits of its time involving an attorney
suing his employer-law firm is the D.C. Circuit case of Mungin v. Katten
Muchin & Zavis. 38 Larry Mungin was a lateral hire to Katten, Muchin &
Zavis' (KMZ's) Washington, D.C. office, supposedly as a bankruptcy
attorney (although there was only one bankruptcy partner and one
bankruptcy associate in this office).3 9 As a double Harvard graduate, a
sixth-year associate, and an African-American, Mungin was a desirable
recruit, although it is questionable whether he was able to bring business to
KMZ during his lateral move. 4 Mungin's basic Title VII claims revolved
around alleged promises for partnership made during his offer negotiations
which were not fulfilled, disparate treatment between the salaries of
Mungin and other sixth-year associates, disparate treatment in the kind of
work that was offered to Mungin, and the denial of a wage increase.41
These employment decisions, according to Mungin, were made because of
his race. Mungin claimed that while he was only originally offered
$91,000 for the job, other sixth-year associates at KMZ made between
$95,000 and $102,000.42 Furthermore, Mungin claimed that he was given
sub-standard work, was denied the partnership considerations allegedly
promised to him43 and was precluded from meeting key contacts in the
Finance and Reorganization Department, 44 the department responsible for
the Bankruptcy Group.
Various factors eventually led to Mungin's departure from the firm.
The managing partners of the D.C. office left the firm,45 leaving Mungin as
the only bankruptcy attorney in the D.C. office. Mungin, severely
disappointed by the firm's suggestion to move him to the New York office
38. 116 F.3d 1549 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
39. Id. at 1551.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1554.
42. Id. at 1551, 1554.
43. Id. at 1551.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1552.
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(where there was no bankruptcy practice) instead of the Chicago office,46
left the firm fully armed with severance pay.47 He then filed a Title VII
charge of constructive discharge and racial discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, which was denied 8 Thereafter,
KMZ officially offered Mungin the opportunity to transfer to the Chicago,
New York, or Los Angeles offices, all of which Mungin declined
whereupon he filed the suit in question 9
Despite the fact that the EEOC refused to pursue Mungin's claim, the
district court found that Mungin met the McDonnell-Douglas/Burdine
standard for unlawful discrimination.5 ° The district court held that Mungin
had provided enough evidence to prove constructive discharge.5 The jury
awarded Mungin a total of 2.5 million dollars in compensatory and punitive
damages.5 2
But the D.C. Circuit disagreed. The court focused on whether Mungin
had met the burden of persuasion. It held that once both sides have met
their burdens of production, and a full trial has been held, the McDonnell-
Douglas/Burdine standard drops out of the equation.54 Using this standard,
the court concluded that Mungin had not met the ultimate burden of
persuasion,55 that he was not unlawfully discriminated against in his
salary,56 work assignments,5 7 and partnership decisions.5  It found that
Mungin never proved that the employment decisions were made because of
his race,5 9 and the numerical comparison between his salary and the salary
of other sixth-year associates was unpersuasive since he compared himself
with "homegrown associates," rather than laterals like himself.60 The court
found that Mungin did not present any evidence that would rebut KMZ's
nondiscriminatory, legitimate reasons for the actions taken. 6' The D.C.
Circuit's decision in Mungin rested mainly on Mungin's inability to meet
the pretext prong. Mungin was unable to show that he was treated
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1553.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1550.
51. Id. at 1558.
52. Id. at 1550.
53. Id. at 1554.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1557.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1556.
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differently from white associates simply because of his race. 6' The court
ruled that the jury lacked sufficient evidence to have made a reasonable
finding of unlawful discrimination.63
The D.C. Circuit's decision is peculiar in one major respect. The
question of whether the evidence cumulatively reveals unlawful
discrimination (and hence the area of pretext) is a question of fact reserved
for the jury.64 Courts are usually reluctant to overturn a jury verdict, and
usually when it is done, it is the trial judge who does so by granting
judgment as a matter of law. 65 The fact that the trial judge in this case
thought that the evidence was compelling enough to find unlawful
discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence, makes it odd that the
appellate court disagreed. To overturn the verdict, the appellate court must
have found that the decision was clearly erroneous, a very high standard of
66review. Admittedly, the evidence on the record appeared to have a lot of
flaws. But it brings up a question which the Supreme Court has not been
able to resolve in Title VII cases: what kind of evidence and how much
evidence is considered enough to meet the burden of persuasion? In any
event, the Mungin case was significant in that it was one of the few cases in
which a Title VII case against a law firm not only went to trial, but was
actually decided by a jury in favor of the employee.
While the Mungin case actually made it to trial, it is more likely that
Title VII cases, especially those brought against law firms, fail at summary
judgment. One example, also in the D.C. Circuit, is Jackson v. Finnegan,
67Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, where plaintiffs counsel may
have caused the case to falter. Here, the district court found that the
plaintiffs pleadings were severely deficient, and the case turned more on
the inadequacies of the attorney in meeting his pleading deadlines, rather
than the actual merits of the case.6' The D.C. Circuit upheld the district
court's right to refuse time extensions for the plaintiff.69 Another such
example is Wilson v. Legal Assistance of South Dakota,7 ° where a Native
American lawyer filed a section 1981 claim of racial discrimination against
a law firm that she believed delayed her job interview because of her race.
62. Id. at 1558.
63. Id.
64. Burrell v. Bd. of Trs. of Ga. Military Coll., 125 F.3d 1390, 1394 (1 1th Cir. 1997);
Schwaller v. Squire Sanders & Dempsey, 249 A.D.2d 195, 197 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
65. See, e.g., Winarto v. Toshiba Am. Elec. Components, Inc., 274 F.3d 1276, 1283
(9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that a trial court that overturns a jury verdict can do so only if
"under governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict").
66. Burrell, 125 F.3d at 1394.
67. 101 F.3d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
68. Id. at 147-49.
69. Id. at 151.
70. 669 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1982).
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Here, the district court found, and the Eighth Circuit agreed, that the
plaintiff failed to meet her prima facie case because she was invited to
interview for the position long before the suit began, but turned it down due
to speculations about discrimination. 7  In Wright v. Wolpoff &
Ambramson,n the court held that the plaintiff could not meet his prima
facie case of discrimination because there was no evidence that an adverse
employment decision was made.73
In carefully evaluating the aforementioned cases, one will find that in
most of them the plaintiff failed at summary judgment because of an
inability to meet the burden of production necessary for the prima facie
case, or judgment as a matter of law was entered in favor of the defendant
because the plaintiff failed to meet the ultimate burden of persuasion
through pretextual evidence after the defense had submitted a
nondiscriminatory legitimate reason for the employment decision. This
strengthens the argument that racial discrimination claims under Title VII
fail simply because of the difficulty of meeting the standards of proof.
B. Sexual Harassment and Discrimination Cases Under Title VII
Both corporations and legal employers have experienced an increase
in reported incidents of sexual harassment.74  Claims against legal
employers have been brought to the forefront of harassment cases as more
employees have been willing to file suits. There are two basic issues in
every sexual harassment case: 1) did any sexual harassment occur; and 2) if
sexual harassment is proven, who may be held liable? 75 It appears that the
primary objective of these cases is not to deter wrongdoers, but to promote
harassment-free workplaces. Legal employers in these cases are treated in
the same fashion as corporations.
One would believe that sexual harassment cases would be easier to
prove than run-of-the mill discrimination cases for several reasons. First, it
appears that a sexual harassment charge is easier to prove. The definition
of sexual harassment requires that there is unwanted physical or verbal
sexual conduct made in the work environment.76 Second, the sexual
harassment does not have to be brought to the employer's attention in order
71. Id. at 564.
72. 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 2936.
73. Id. at *2-*3.
74. In fact, the number of EEOC sexual harassment complaints filed by men alone has
quadrupled within the past decade to the point where they account for 13.6 percent of all
complaints. See Eyres, supra note 7, at 40.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 46 n.28 (citing EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29
C.F.R. ch. xiv, pt. 1604, §1604.11 1990).
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for the employer to be held vicariously liable.77 The unwanted sexual
conduct must be both objectively and subjectively offensive.78 To make
out a prima facie case of harassment, the harassing conduct must
substantially affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment.79 While
proving these things is no easy task, the burden-shifting ping-pong match
that exists for proving discrimination is simply not required for sexual
harassment cases. At the same time, because the case deals with terms of
employment, a case can be made under Title VII.
80
When there is only circumstantial evidence, sexual discrimination
cases are treated the same as racial discrimination cases, in that they use the
McDonnell-Douglas/Burdine standard.81 In these cases, just as in other
Title VII cases, direct evidence of discrimination is required to make out a
mixed-motive case under Price Waterhouse. Many of the sexual
discrimination suits have been brought against law firms for discriminatory
hiring practices, or partnership/promotion decisions.82  Yet sexual
discrimination also has had the devastating result among lawyers of forcing
women to leave the law completely.83
One example of such a discrimination case was the famous Ezold v.
Wolf Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen.84 Ezold sued Wolf, Block for sexual
discrimination after being denied partnership.85 She also alleged that she
86was constructively discharged. The court found otherwise; while they
agreed with the district court that the plaintiff had met her prima facie case,
they disagreed that the defendant's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
the decision was pretextual8 7  The court rejected the district court's
intrusion into the firm's partnership decisions88 and found that Ezold failed
to prove that the Wolf, Block decision to deny partnership because of her
lack of analytical abilities was pretextual. 89 This is despite the fact that thecourt acknowledged that most of those attorneys who evaluated Ezold were
77. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
78. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787.
79. Howard v. Dep't of Air Force, 877 F.2d 952, 955 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
80. 42 U.S.C.S. §2000e-2(a) (2003).
81. See Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992)
(using the Title VII standard in evaluating a sex discrimination claim).
82. See id. (holding that a rejection of the plaintiff from partnership did not result in
unlawful discrimination).
83. Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories about Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of
Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument,
103 HARV. L. REv. 1750, 1834 n.330 (1990).
84. 983 F.2d 509.
85. Id. at512.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 547.
88. Id. at 527.
89. Id. at 530.
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basing their opinions on hearsay and not on a direct working relationship
with Ezold.90 The Ezold case is another prime example of a sexual
discrimination case that failed because of lack of proof, a common problem
in Title VII cases.
For the most part, sexual harassment and discrimination cases do not
have a higher probability of getting past summary judgment when
compared to racial discrimination cases. Failures under summary judgment
occur for several reasons. Those already discussed include the failure to
make out a prima facie case and the failure to meet the ultimate burden of
persuasion,9' but summary judgment can also be granted if the plaintiff
fails to submit a timely charge to a state agency or the EEOC before
bringing suit. 92 Like racial discrimination cases, without direct evidence,
sexual discrimination cases are often tossed out for insufficient evidence.
The insufficient evidence cases have sometimes spawned from the idea still
embraced by some courts that women are not interested in certain positions
or jobs simply because they are not traditionally conducive to being held by
women.93 But this theory completely ignores the fact that in many aspects
employers have contributed to creating these images of who women should
be and what jobs they are "fit" for.
94
Because of the treatment of sexual discrimination cases in courts, it is
questionable whether law firms have learned their lessons from these suits.
It has been reported that at the same time the sexual discrimination suit
Hishon v. King & Spalding95 was argued before the Supreme Court, King
& Spalding held a swimsuit competition which awarded the winner of the
competition a full-time offer with the firn. 96  The competition was
originally planned as a wet t-shirt contest, but this idea was scrapped after
90. Id. at 527.
91. See generally Schwaller v. Squire Sanders & Dempsey, 249 A.D.2d 195, 196 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1998) (finding that the New York Supreme Court erred in not granting summary
judgment in favor of the defendants when the plaintiff used non-probative pretextual
evidence to meet the burden of persuasion).
92. Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 (3d Cir. 1994).
93. Schultz, supra note 83, at 1756.
94. Id. Schultz argues:
By assuming that women form stable job aspirations before they begin working,
courts have missed the ways in which employers contribute to creating women
workers in their images of who 'women' are supposed to be. Judges have placed
beyond the law's reach the structural features of the workplace that gender jobs
and people, and disempower women from aspiring to higher-paying
nontraditional employment.
Id.
95. 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
96. Schultz, supra note 83, at 1835 n.333.
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complaints were made about the contest.97 These sorts of attitudes by law
firms are only fueled by the courts' treatment of sexual discrimination
suits.
Sexual harassment cases, on the other hand, are different. For one, as
mentioned previously, the rules of proof for sexual harassment are
different.98 One reason for this difference may be that in sexual harassment
cases it is more likely that there is direct evidence. Unlike discriminatory
animus which is usually based on subjective factors, harassment is usually
noticeable and objective. It requires actual physical occurrences, improper
gestures, or words.99 Because of this, sexual harassment cases have a better
chance of succeeding past summary judgment.
One example of a sexual harassment suit getting past a motion to
dismiss is Ravinskas v. Karalekas,'0° which involved the interpretation of
the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA).0 1 The defendant
firm in that case tried to dismiss the plaintiff" s sexual harassment claim by
interpreting the DCHRA as disallowing suits against sole proprietorships.l2
The court held that since Title VII expressly includes sole proprietorships
as employers, the DCHRA, which was modeled after Title VII, also allows
sole proprietorships to be sued under its Act.
10 3
But even with the greater success rate for sexual harassment cases
against legal employers, they may still have difficulties surpassing
summary judgment. In Ballen-Steir v. Hahn & Hessen,' 4 a New York
appellate court upheld a motion to dismiss a female partner's sexual
harassment claim because the harassment involved acts that occurred while
she was a partner.'0 5 The New York City Human Rights Law, like Title
VII, only allows for adverse employment actions to be protected under the
Act, and since partners of law firms are not considered employees, they
cannot bring claims for adverse employment actions under this statute. 106
The court did find that the plaintiff could bring suit for those harassment
activities that occurred while the plaintiff was an associate.' ° 7
97. Id.
98. Eyres, supra note 7, at 40, 42.
99. Id. at 42.
100. 741 F. Supp. 978 (D.D.C. 1990).
101. D.C. CODE ANN. § 2512 (1990) (current version at D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1401.01
(2003)).
102. Id. at 979.
103. Id. at 980.
104. 727 N.Y.S.2d 421 (App. Div. 2001).
105. Id. at 422.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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IV. A GENERAL THEORY FOR WHY TITLE VII CLAIMS AGAINST LEGAL
EMPLOYERS LOSE ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Title VII suits are rarely won against non-legal employers, but the
track record is worse for legal employers. 108 Despite the dramatic increase
in multiculturalism in American society, women and minorities still are
severely underrepresented in law firms and in the legal profession as a
whole.'19 For instance, despite the increasing number of women who go to
law school and enter the profession," ° women are still underrepresented as
law firm partners."' Although some of this has to do with the fact that
many women leave firms before reaching the partnership level in pursuit of
marriage and parenthood,'1 2 it is very likely that some of these statistics are
108. See supra Part III (providing an overview of discrimination cases against legal
employers).
109. See Dimitra Kessenides, Race and the Law: Raising the Bar, JD JUNGLE, Oct./Nov.
2003, at 50, available at http://www.jdjungle.com/magazine.cfm?INC=incarticle.cfm&arti
d=50812&template=0. Kessenides interviewed Dennis Archer, president of the American
Bar Association. After grading the legal field's commitment to diversity at a four on a scale
of 1 to 10, Mr. Archer stated that:
There are 1,049,000 lawyers who are licensed to practice law in the U.S. Less
than 14 percent are lawyers of color. Just adding up Hispanics and African
Americans in this country you get 25 percent of the population. From a historic
point of view, when you consider that we were discriminated against. .. you
begin to appreciate why we are so underrepresented in the profession.
110. In 2001, it was projected that 48% of all law students were women and that 29% of
all licensed attorneys were women. Jacquelyn H. Slotkin, Should I Have Learned to Cook?
Interviews with Women Lawyers Juggling Multiple Roles, 13 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J., 147,
148 (2002). The EEOC has reported that the number of women receiving law degrees has
increased from 33 % in 1982 to 48.3 % in 2002. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, DIVERSITY IN LAW FIRMS (2003), available at, http://www.eeoc.govlstatsl
reports/diversitylaw/. While the number of women law students has increased, state laws
curtailing affirmative action programs in law schools have led to a decrease in the number
of minorities in law firms, particularly in Texas where you have "an exponential growth in
Hispanics coupled with a decline in law school admissions." Michael D. Goldhaber,
Minorities Surge at Big Law Firms: Asian-Americans, especially, swell ranks; Hispanics
and blacks also up, THE NAT'L L.J., Dec. 14, 1998, available at http://www.ruf.rice.edu/-cs
a/text/APAlaw.html (quoting Dan Perez, a director of the Hispanic National Bar
Association). While the recent University of Michigan Law School decision has for the
time being reaffirmed the survival of affirmative action programs in law schools, it is
uncertain how this decision will affect law school admissions in states like Texas and
California, where affirmative action programs have been met with scrupulous rejection.
See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325 (2003) (upholding the use of race as a positive
factor in law school admissions programs).
111. Slotkin, supra note 110, at 151.
112. See id. at 152 (acknowledging that many women leave the firm because of familial
role conflicts).
2004]
804 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 6:3
a result of sex discrimination. In relation to minorities in law firms in
1998, four major law firms in metropolitan cities reported having no
minority associates, while three major law firms had no minority
partners.' Because of this, Title VII suits against law firms have become
more prevalent, particularly as women and minority attorneys and law
students gain the nerve to challenge the status quo.' 4 A wave of suits
against law firms took place between the 1960s and 1990s, most of which
were filed by individual law students and attorneys, but also by law school
career placement offices that had experienced discriminatory recruitment
practices by law firms while helping law students search for jobs.15
Title VII suits are rarely successful against any employer, let alone
legal employers. One of the reasons for the failure rate of Title VII claims
stems from the standard of proof imposed upon plaintiffs. In McDonnell-
Douglas Corp. v. Green,"6 the Supreme Court held that in order for
plaintiffs to sustain a claim for employment discrimination under Title VII,
they must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing: 1)
that they are a minority; 2) that they applied for a job for which they were
qualified and for which the employer was seeking applications; 3) that
despite their qualifications they were rejected; and 4) after rejection, the
position remained open and the employer continued to seek others of the
same qualifications." 7 Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the
defendant must provide a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the
defendant's conduct. 118 The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to prove that
the defendant's reasons are pretextual. 119
The burdens of proof under Title VII only add to the difficulty in
proving discrimination. The problem for plaintiffs in Title VII cases often
arises in proving the prima facie case. Title VII was not created to
guarantee a job to all minorities regardless of qualifications. Instead, it
only requires a "removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the
basis of racial or other impermissible classification.' ' 20 The Act was
created to eliminate racial or sexual discrimination of all kinds, no matter
113. Goldhaber, supra note 110.
114. See Nancy L. Farrer, Of Ivory Columns and Glass Ceilings: The Impact of the
Supreme Court of the United States on the Practice of Women Attorneys in Law Firms, 28
ST. MARY'S L.J. 529, 549-52 (1997) (describing several female attorneys' attempts to
challenge gender discrimination in law firm hiring by filing Title VII actions).
115. Id. at551.
116. 411 U.S. 792.
117. Id. at 802.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 804.
120. Id. at 801 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
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how subtle.12' So why then are so many discrimination cases thrown out on
summary judgment?
The answer lies in the difficulty of proving that management decisions
were race- or sex-motivated. This stems first from the difficulty in proving
the first prong of the burden of proof, the prima facie case. Without
evidence of a pattern of discriminatory employment practices, the
employee will have a difficult time creating a prima facie case for
employment discrimination. For example, an African-American associate
who is denied a promotion to partnership must show more than that he is
African-American and was denied the promotion, he must also prove that
he was qualified for the promotion, and that the firm continued to seek
associates of that level of qualification. Often the plaintiff's case still will
not be meritorious unless the person chosen for the job is less qualified and
of a different race or sex.
The second problem in proving race or sex motivations lies in the
second prong of the burden of proof. If the employer asserts a non-
discriminatory reason then the plaintiff has the burden of proving that this
reason was pretextual. In other words, it is not enough that the prima facie
case is established; the presumption of discrimination fails when an
employer establishes a "legitimate" reason for the decision. The legitimate
reason prong of the test makes proving an employment discrimination
claim difficult. This is perhaps the only way to prove that the decision was
not completely race- or sex-motivated. If even one legitimate non-
discriminatory purpose is found, then the employer has met its burden,
even if sex or race was the main factor or possibly the only factor in the
decision-making. This leads to employers who cover their discriminatory
decisions by coming up with "legitimate" excuses for having made the
decision. Particularly where litigation is threatened, employers could
provide cover-ups for the decision by digging deep into the plaintiffs
personnel files to find anything, especially miniscule slip-ups, that would
create a legitimate reason for the decision.
For this reason, the Supreme Court created the third prong, allowing
the plaintiff to provide proof that the employer's reasons are pretextual.1
2
But the third prong tends to create a third hurdle in establishing race or sex
motivations because it is difficult to meet. An employer does not waive a
red banner saying that it discriminates. A discriminatory decision is often
subjective, and a subjective decision is almost impossible to prove unless it
is revealed to testifying witnesses. Because of this, employees who may
have been victims of discrimination have a hard time proving it.
The high burden of proof contributes to the decreased amount of Title
121. Id. at 801.
122. Id. at 804.
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VII claims against all employers and not just legal employers. Yet Title
VII claims are not only less likely to be filed against legal employers, but
are also less successful than claims against non-legal employers. What
accounts for the difference if the burden of proof is the same?
While a high burden of proof is one of the main difficulties in winning
a Title VII case against a legal employer, another reason for such difficulty
peculiar to this type of scenario stems from the difficulty of determining
whether an attorney is an employee. Generally, law firm partners are not
considered employees, so that if there is discrimination against another
partner, that partner cannot file a Title VII suit. 23 Attorneys with other
titles run into the same problems when bringing discrimination suits. 
24
While high burdens of proof and the difficulty in determining if an attorney
is an employee are general reasons the courts have explored as to the lack
of success for Title VII suits against legal employers, there are other
theories that have yet to be explored.
V. ALTERNATIVE THEORIES AS TO WHY TITLE VII CLAIMS AGAINST
LEGAL EMPLOYERS FAIL BEFORE A SUIT IS EVEN FILED
A. Lack of Proof as the Cause of Failure of Title VII Claims
One theory for the difference in treatment lies in the minimum amount
of proof against discriminatory legal employers. Because of the difficulty
in finding direct evidence of discrimination which would allow for a
mixed-motive case, or enough circumstantial evidence to prove unlawful
discrimination under McDonnell-Douglas/Burdine, most cases for
discrimination fail at summary judgment. This is only heightened in the
case of the legal profession, where the increased stress levels of the
profession, particularly for young attorneys, often make it difficult to
discern whether an associate is being discriminated against because of an
immutable characteristic, or because he or she cannot cut it in the
profession.
Here is a typical scenario: Sarah, a newly hired associate at ABC Law
Firm, was the only female hired by the firm this year. Six months into the
job, Sarah has done very little besides document reviews and making
copies. Her male first-year colleagues have all written their first briefs or
contracts. A few of her male counterparts have even argued motions in
123. See Ballen-Steir v. Hahn & Hessen, 727 N.Y.S.2d 421, 422 (App. Div. 2001)
(prohibiting a sexual harassment claim brought by a female partner).
124. See generally Montgomery v. Lobman, Carnahan, Batt & Angelle, 729 So. 2d 1075,
1077-79 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (analyzing whether the plaintiff, a director of an attorney
professional corporation, was considered an employee for the purpose of the Louisiana
Employment Discrimination Law).
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court. On the surface it appears that Sarah is being given lowly
assignments merely because she is a woman, which of course is
discriminatory under Title VII. But the fact that she has less prestigious
assignments is probably not enough direct evidence to prove mixed-motive
discrimination, or enough circumstantial evidence to prove unlawful
discrimination, particularly if the employer articulates a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for the employment decision. The above scenario
would probably create enough circumstantial evidence for a prima facie
case. It is easy to see, however, how the employer can articulate a non-
discriminatory reason and meet the second prong here. For instance,
perhaps Sarah's supervising partner simply believes she is not ready for
more difficult assignments, or Sarah's department is lacking in case loads,
or Sarah's supervisor simply does not like her, not because she is a woman,
but because she is unproductive.
It soon becomes clear that the line of whether an act is discriminatory
is hard to define. Prejudice is legal; it is only when prejudice of a protected
class influences employment decisions that it becomes illegal. In the world
of law, particularly in law firms, associates come and go, many within their
first five years of being at the firm. To prove that this is attributed to
discrimination is difficult enough in cases against corporations which have
higher retention rates; all the more so to prove it in law firms where only
the strongest and most diligent persons make it to partner status.
Therefore, many attorneys may refuse to file suit against a legal employer
simply because of the added difficulty in finding proof of discrimination.
B. Retaliation and Backlash by the Legal Community
The second theory why Title VII cases are rarely brought against legal
employers is because of the enormous amount of backlash plaintiffs face
within the legal community. An attorney who files suit against his or her
law firm may come across a certain amount of snubbing in the legal
community. The local bar associations, to which every attorney in the
region belongs, provide social interactions amongst attorneys during which
news of discrimination allegations may spread like wildfire. If a plaintiff
loses, which is most often the case, finding a job in the same legal
community is going to be extremely difficult. These sorts of suits are
embarrassing, both to the law firm, where good reputations are required for
client-building, and for the plaintiff-attorney who suffers from burned
bridges made during the battle. This leads most attorneys to simply leave
the firm rather than report the discrimination to a civil rights organization
or sue.
Attorneys have more of an incentive to leave the firm rather than
reporting discrimination claims because of the importance of attorney
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reputations in the legal community. The importance of attorney reputation
creates a reluctance in attorneys to come forward and thus may account for
the difference in the amount of discrimination suits brought against legal
employers. The life of an attorney is competitive. This is particularly true
for young associates, who are constantly in a battle to prove themselves in
the profession and distinguish themselves from their peers. Because local
bar associations are so insular, individual lawyers' reputations are
extremely fragile. An attorney who makes a discrimination claim can be
seen as a troublemaker, and may face blackballing in the legal community
as retaliation for making a claim.' 25 Since an attorney can only practice in
the state where he or she is admitted, a scarred reputation in the legal
community is devastating to the blackballed attorney, who then will have a
difficult time getting a job within that state. This makes filing a
discrimination claim riskier for an attorney than for an ordinary corporate
employee where the professional community is larger; thus it is easier to
find work in the corporate community despite a discrimination claim.
Attorneys depend on their reputations not only to get a job, but also to
remain in good standing with the courts (after all, judges are lawyers and
members of the Bar as well) and with their clients. The risk of damaging
those reputations, and thus severely handicapping one's livelihood as an
attorney, is not often a risk one is willing to take. Therefore, even if there
is blatant proof of discrimination, the attorney may seek to leave the job
behind rather than file suit.
Retaliation for filing discrimination/harassment claims under Title VII
is a separate cause of action completely. 26 Title VII only covers retaliation
by the defendant-employer. In the cases of legal employers, however, the
retaliation may not come from the legal employer, but from the
surrounding legal community. The situation is further exacerbated where
the plaintiff-attorney is a young associate just starting out in the Bar and the
defendant-employer is a prestigious law firm whose decision-makers are
powerful attorneys with long-standing reputations. It is not hard to believe
that many members of the Bar will side with the employer when an
attorney brings discrimination/harassment allegations. This gives plaintiff-
attorneys even more of a reason to not report the discrimination/harassment
claims.
125. See, e.g., Eyres, supra note 7, at 39-40 (describing how retaliation for sexual
harassment claims has increased in law offices, leading to a decrease in harassment
complaints).
126. Id. at 45.
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C. Law Firm Atmospheres As a Barrier to Title VII Reporting
Are law firm atmospheres conducive to reporting harassment and
discrimination claims? Minorities and women are still underrepresented in
positions of power, and that includes key positions in today's law firms. 27
Because of this, a lot of women and minorities enter the firm without
feeling the support and mentoring possibilities that are made available to
Caucasian male colleagues. This creates inevitable tensions, and often
leads to hostile work environments in an atmosphere that is often already
highly competitive. But is the problem actually related to race or sex?
Discrimination is often something that is easily masked, and law firms
are not known for their endearing hospitality. The associate hazing process
at big firms gives law students nightmares. So how does one distinguish
between ordinary associate hazing and actual sex or racial discrimination?
How can one tell if the associate is being treated differently because of a
lack of ability perceived by supervising partners, or whether they are being
treated differently because of a classification? For instance, a female
associate who only takes assignments that are given to her and never seeks
any on her own, would not have a sexual discrimination claim against the
firm simply because male associates who are go-getters and jump at the
chance to go above and beyond, get better assignments.
Additionally, the hostility of law firm environments in general
sometimes blurs the line between hazing and discrimination. Consider the
Asian female associate who has no trouble receiving assignments. But she
receives too many assignments, nearly twice the amount of work as the
non-minority associates that are in her year of practice and in her
department. Although she complains to her supervising attorney about the
amount of work, she is told that if sh& wants to keep her job then she will
have to take on the tasks given to her. Is the firm trying to force the
associate out because of her race? Or is she simply being hazed by a
ruthless supervisor? The problem with this sort of treatment is obvious.
The cut-throat atmosphere in the firm helps the partners get the work that
they need from the associates which will help them make the profits that
they want. But because this reality is simply "the way of the firm," the
work atmosphere can create a breeding ground of masked discrimination.
Associates who are new in their careers are often too afraid to report these
claims for the fear of being branded as the lawyer who just could not cut it.
So instead, there is often an exodus from the firm after the first few years
of practice, or an avoidance of firm practice altogether. Associates who
have had enough of the hostility of big firm practice move to smaller firms,
go into public sector practice or professorship, or leave the practice of law
127. Slotkin, supra note I 10, at 149, 151.
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behind altogether. 128 This gives associates who feel discriminated against
the opportunity to leave the firm environment behind without jeopardizing
their reputations in the legal community. However, this exodus is not
specific to associates who have experienced discrimination. Each year big
law firms lose associates for reasons completely unrelated to any protected
class, simply because of the inherently competitive atmosphere of a law
firm. For women, firm life simply is not conducive to family life. The low
number of women who are partners at large firms and are married with
children makes this obvious. 29  So when has an associate's treatment
crossed the line from ordinary associate hazing to unlawful discrimination?
The answer is often unclear, resulting in arduousness in proving
discrimination claims against large law firms.
VI. LAW FIRM REMEDIES TO ALLEVIATE DISCRIMINATION
Although a lot of Title VII cases do not pass summary judgment, the
increase of cases against law firms have caused many firms to create
remedies meant to prevent discrimination, and to make their atmospheres
more attractive for minorities and women by increasing diversity. 3° The
following are a few suggestions of possible remedies used and not used by
firms in addressing these issues.
A. The Creation of Human Resources Departments
One way of preventing workplace discrimination and harassment is to
hire human resources (HR) professionals who are required to address the
concerns of legal personnel. This allows attorneys who have employment
concerns to address them with persons who are not attorneys, and therefore
alleviate hesitations caused by fear of retaliatory employment decisions.
For this very reason, HR departments within law firms would be more
128. Despite the fact that small firms have the reputation of having more hospitable
atmospheres than large firms, the EEOC has recently determined that minority lawyers are
more likely to associate with large firms, particularly top 100 firms in the top ten legal
markets. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, supra note 110.
129. Although 30% of all lawyers are women, only 11% of that thirty are partners in the
country's 250 largest firms. Slotkin, supra note 110, at 151. Very few of those women
have children. Id. at 152.
130. Generally, the diversity of law firms increases with the diversity in that law firm's
city. In 1998, it was reported that San Francisco, Miami, and New York were the most
diverse cities; therefore it was no surprise that in that year San Francisco's Graham &
James, L.L.P. had the highest number of Asian-American partners (18) and Miami's Steel
Hector & Davis L.L.P. had the highest number of Hispanic partners (18). See Goldhaber,
supra note 110. Washington D.C.'s Covington & Burling ranked highest for Black partners
as a percentage of all partners (5%). Id. New York appeared to be the exception in that two
New York firms were reported in 1998 to have no minority partners. Id.
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beneficial if they were not composed of attorneys. HR professionals could
perform internal investigations of complaints, and should have the power to
make punitive employment decisions based on their findings. Preventive
measures concerning applicant flow data and diversity sensitivity training
could be run through the department, synonymous to the functions of
personnel departments in corporations.
One firm that has created a HR department in its two big offices in
San Francisco and New York is Thelen Reid & Priest, LLP.' The San
Francisco office, in particular, has two HR managers who work
independently from the Attorney Recruiting Manager, with their own HR
administrative staff.' In other words, they have a complete HR
department that is detached from the legal environment of the firm.
B. Diversity Committees
Many firms have begun to organize diversity committees composed of
attorneys recruited to evaluate firm atmospheres. 33 These committees,
which are often composed of partners as well as associates, create plans for
the recruitment of new attorneys as well as evaluate proposals to the
general partners as to part-time positions, associate work hours and
promotional opportunities. An effective diversity committee is one whose
proposals are valued and honestly considered by the partners, leading to the
reason why it is imperative to have more partners than associates on the
committee. Committees that are created only for appearance's sake are
ineffective and a waste of time.
In order to increase the power of diversity committees, two firms have
decided to make partners financially accountable for not bringing in diverse
candidates.' 34 In the late 90s, the co-head of St. Louis-based Bryan Cave,
L.L.P. decided to include the diversity question in an annual self-evaluation
form that determines a partner's annual draw.135 Denver-based Holland &
Hart, L.L.P. also included the diversity question in their semi-annual
compensation assessment forms. 136 The idea was taken from two of the
firm's clients, Sears and Xerox, who had similar evaluations for their top
131. See generally at http://www.thelenreid.com/recruit/positions-s_idx.htm (last visited
Mar. 1, 2004).
132. Thelen Reid & Priest Recruitment Open Positions at http://www.thelenreid.com/rec
ruit/contact us idx.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2004).
133. Tatiana Boncompagni, Evaluating Diversity: How can a firm get its partners to pay
more attention to diversity? By bringing up the subject at compensation time, (Fall 2001),
MINORiTY L.J. available at http://www.minoritylawjoumal.com/fall01/texts/management.ht
ml (last visited Mar. 1, 2004).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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executives. 37 Despite this stride for diversity, the results of the evaluation
forms have not manifested themselves in diversity numbers."' While
Bryan Cave's number of minority attorneys increased from 19 of 498 in
1997 to 53 of 553 in 2001, the number of minority partners at the firm only
increased from 6 of 221 in 1997 to 9 of 231 in 2001.139 Holland & Hart has
had even slower progress with the number of minority associates only
increasing from 6.25 percent in 1996 to 6.85 percent in 2001 and for
partners, 1 of 113 in 1997 and 2 of 126 in 2001.'4 Holland & Hart blames
'4'
the lack of success on a depletion of minority recruits in the Denver area.
While progress has been slow in both firms, the inclusion of the diversity
question in partner evaluation forms represents one of the more innovative
ideas used by diversity committees to increase minority recruitment at law
firms.
C. Diversity Managers
Some firms have hired full-time diversity managers to prevent and
manage Title VII concerns in the law firm. 42 Their duties can include
recruitment procedures, associate counseling, and report-creation for
diversity statistical data.143 The move to firm diversity managers has only
been heightened by the increased pressure by firm clientele to increase
diversity among their ranks.' 44 Sullivan & Cromwell's diversity manager,
Kandance Weems-Norris, commented in an article that she had "handled
questions from clients who want numbers and statistics and a narrative
[about minority associates and partners].' ' 45 In-house law departments,
whose corporations have established diversity programs to defend Title VII
suits, have continued to put pressure on law firms to increase diversity,
hoping that by doing so they will increase the available number of minority
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Seven New York firms have hired full-time diversity managers who have formed
the New York Law Firm Consortium to promote dialogue and share frustrations about the
retention and hiring of minority lawyers. These firms are: Sullivan & Cromwell; Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom; Shearman & Sterling; Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz;
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson; Weil, Gotshal & Manges; and O'Melveny &
Myers. See Thomas Adcock, New York Law Firm Consortium Grapples with Diversity,
N.Y. L.J., June 10, 2002, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=10229543001
75 (last visited Mar. 1, 2004) (describing the New York Law Firm Consortium's diversity
initiatives).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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lawyers in their departments.
146
A full-time diversity manager is more desirable and may be more
effective than a part-time manager, since a lawyer whose time is split
between his or her work and the diversity project is more likely to consider
the diversity project as a lesser priority. What is not suggested is that
diversity decisions be placed solely in the hands of recruitment personnel,
who may have limited managerial discretion and are more likely to be
administrative personnel than actual attorneys.
D. Affirmative Action Policies
A law firm cannot establish a voluntary affirmative action policy
unless it formally acknowledges at the outset that women and minorities
have historically been underrepresented in the firm.1 4 7 The problem here is
apparent; few firms are willing to admit historical under-representation.
Many corporations have embraced affirmative action policies because, in
order to accept government contracts, they have had to meet EEO
requirements. 148  Many law firms, because of their small employee sizes
and thus inapplicability to Title VII, do not have the same incentive;
nevertheless, as firm clients, these corporations have begun to enforce the
diversity issue within particular firms. 1
49
Every firm should have some sort of a diversity policy, which means
more than a one-line "equal opportunity employer" message pasted in
recruitment materials. The policy should outline application procedures,
methods for recruiting more diverse candidates (for instance, recruiting
from historically black law schools or seeking female laterals), and formal
146. Lloyd W. Johnson, Jr., Workforce Diversity: It's a Business Priority At Merck &
Co., Inc., DIVERSITY AND THE BAR, Aug. 1998, at http://www.mcca.com/site/data/AboutMC
CA/News/workforcediversity.htm (describing Merck's inquiries to its principal outside
counsel firms regarding their diversity numbers). See also Kessenides, supra note 109, at
52 (quoting Dennis Archer as stating that demands made by corporate clients that law firms
diversify their workforces will drive the legal diversity commitment). See generally Alea
Jasmin Mitchell, Spotlighting MCCA 's 2003 Award Winners: The Winners' Circle: Profiles
of Top Departments and Law Firms, DIVERSITY & THE BAR, Nov./Dec. 2003, at
http://www.mcca.com/site/data/corporate/Awards/2003/index.html (highlighting the
recipients of the Sager and Trailblazer Awards, two awards given by corporate counsel to
legal employers that have demonstrated a strong commitment to diversity) (last visited Mar.
1,2004).
147. See, e.g., Women In the Law - Outside Counsel Deborah Weinstein: Promoting
Diversity in Law Firms and Corporate Legal Departments, Eckert Seamans Cherin &
Mellot, L.L.C., at http://www.escm.com/new/art/dw02Ol.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2004)
(explaining how a firm cannot engage in affirmative action unless it establishes a voluntary
affirmative action program, but in order to establish the program, it must admit to past
minority underrepresentation).
148. Id.
149. Id.
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policies for promotion evaluation and partnership decision-making so that
associates are fully aware of the firm's employment decision-making
process.
E. Harassment and Diversity Sensitivity Training
Many corporations have resorted to the use of sensitivity training to
accommodate the pressures of dealing with increasingly diverse
workforces. Law firms, like corporations, are provided access to
consultants that can conduct harassment and/or diversity sensitivity
training. For example, -the Texas-based consulting firm of Employment
Practices Solutions, Inc. provides harassment sensitivity training and deals
with human resources management issues specifically for law firms.150
As in most corporations where a network of policies and personnel are
enacted to relay the employer's zero tolerance policies of sexual
harassment, legal employers should do their part in developing these types
of policies. Here, creating a paper policy is not enough. Zero tolerance
policies should be implemented, enforced, and constantly reinforced by
requiring all employees (including partners) to participate in sensitivity
training and posting zero tolerance policies throughout the employment
facility. Attorneys should be aware of a designated person to whom they
can report harassment claims internally, and the employer should
encourage mediations between the offender and victim. Punitive decision
policies should also be put in place to deter offenders from harassing
employees.
VII. CONCLUSION
Whatever the reasons for discrimination and harassment, attorneys in
law firms should not be precluded from receiving chastisement for proven
discrimination. The fact that there appears to be an increase in these claims
against law firms, even if the suits eventually fail at trial or summary
judgment, should raise red flags to firms that they should create adequate
diversity policies and create internal prevention methods against
discrimination. Diverse environments should be desired for all work
atmospheres, and law firms should embrace this attitude and strive to
increase diversity amongst their ranks. Use of HR departments, diversity
managers, diversity committees, affirmative action policies and
harassment/diversity sensitivity training will help to level the playing field
150. See generally Employment Practices Solutions, Inc., Attorney Services, at
http://www.epexperts.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid= 176
(last visited Mar. 1, 2004) (providing consulting services for law firms with employment
discrimination issues).
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at most law firms and create environments that are welcoming to all
genders and races.
